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5 月 6 日，這一天的開幕式和胡佛貨幣政策一樣。
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1天前
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2022年5月24日
本文最初由《暴躁不安》
《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家》發(fā)表5 月 6 日，這 一場(chǎng)會(huì)議最后的 回歸和胡佛
貨幣政策一樣。唉，視頻成績(jī)單和所有這些都沒有準(zhǔn)備好。
，我為我的簡(jiǎn)短演講寫了一篇論文；多虧了胡佛團(tuán)隊(duì)，我還得到了演講的抄錄。標(biāo)題是現(xiàn)在和
未來(lái)的熱議：熱議、熱議和未來(lái)”。但是，但它的發(fā)布了其他小說(shuō)、 物價(jià)水平理論博客很重要的零碎聯(lián)想。 漂亮的重復(fù)，越來(lái)越多的包裝和最近的屏幕。這是一個(gè)個(gè)性化的文章，更短它不同的尺寸：
過(guò)去、現(xiàn)在和未來(lái)的緊急情況：財(cái)政、沖擊和財(cái)政危機(jī)
現(xiàn)在，我們已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了，很不錯(cuò)的 反應(yīng)。
為什么？通貨膨脹從何而來(lái)，是第一個(gè)問題，查理·普洛瑟（Charlie Plosser）在他對(duì)本屆會(huì)議的精彩序言中給出了答案：政府基本上做了一個(gè)財(cái)政直升飛機(jī)，以特別有力的方式發(fā)送了五到六萬(wàn)億美元的資金。他們寄給人們支票，一半是新的儲(chǔ)備，一半是借來(lái)的。這是一次財(cái)政直升機(jī)投降。想象一下，這只是 6 萬(wàn)億美元的公開市場(chǎng)操作。好吧，正如拉里剛剛告訴我們的那樣，增加 6 萬(wàn)億美元的 10 美元鈔票和減少 6 萬(wàn)億美元的100 美元鈔票不會(huì)有太大的不同。如果沒有赤字，肯定不會(huì)產(chǎn)生如此巨大的影響。
這種沖動(dòng)也不是利率政策的錯(cuò)。利率剛剛持平。人們可以責(zé)怪美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)促成了巨大的直升機(jī)下跌，但不能歸咎于巨大的利率沖擊。
這就是通貨膨脹的沖動(dòng)，但是現(xiàn)在通貨膨脹了嗎？現(xiàn)在，注意力轉(zhuǎn)向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)。正如您在第一張圖中看到的那樣，當(dāng)通貨膨脹從財(cái)政沖擊中消失時(shí)， 利率保持不變。
所以下一個(gè)問題是，這反應(yīng)慢嗎？這段時(shí)期的名義利率遠(yuǎn)低于通脹，構(gòu)成額外的貨幣刺激，這會(huì)自行造成額外的通脹嗎？還是我們只是在等待財(cái)政（或供應(yīng)，如果必須的話）沖擊結(jié)束？
按照歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)肯定落后于曲線。在這張圖表中，箭頭指向自 1960 年以來(lái)的每一次緊縮。在每一次緊縮中，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在當(dāng)前通貨膨脹的情況下，利率大致為一對(duì)一或多。即使在可怕的 1970 年代，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)也從未等待一整年才采取任何行動(dòng)。
為什么美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)現(xiàn)在花了這么長(zhǎng)時(shí)間才采取行動(dòng)？這個(gè)問題有很多答案，我會(huì)的不要深入研究它。其中一個(gè)功能可能用于病房指導(dǎo)，前一個(gè)小組提到了這一點(diǎn)。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)保持低利率是因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)表示將保持低利率。有一個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)室正式的新戰(zhàn)略說(shuō)我們將保持低利率。我認(rèn)為，這種策略是一條針對(duì)通貨緊縮而精心打造的美麗馬其諾防線，但與原來(lái)的策略一樣，它忘記了：如果德國(guó)人轉(zhuǎn)而通過(guò)阿登山脈會(huì)怎樣？我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了拉里和約翰·泰勒之間的半途而廢。前瞻指引的問題是，有人相信美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)在事后采取行動(dòng)嗎？（時(shí)間一致性。）像我這樣說(shuō)不的批評(píng)者我認(rèn)為被證明是錯(cuò)誤的。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)事后對(duì)它所承諾的事情進(jìn)行了充分的保證。不幸的是，它承諾了一些在當(dāng)時(shí)情況下不合適的東西，這就是指導(dǎo)的全部要點(diǎn)和難題。還有什么約翰會(huì)說(shuō)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)應(yīng)該做出的承諾包括，如果發(fā)生嚴(yán)重的通貨膨脹，通貨膨脹，那么我們會(huì)做其他事情。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)總體上做得太多“這是我們認(rèn)為會(huì)發(fā)生的事情，所以這就是我們將要做的事情”，而應(yīng)急計(jì)劃太少以防萬(wàn)一事情不順利它的項(xiàng)目。我們剛剛了解到，這可以在很大程度上以驚人的速度發(fā)生。軍事規(guī)劃者知道這一點(diǎn)。他們對(duì)他們的預(yù)測(cè)進(jìn)行紅隊(duì)，對(duì)不太可能發(fā)生的意外事件著迷，并通過(guò)詳細(xì)的自我批評(píng)調(diào)查來(lái)跟蹤失敗。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)也應(yīng)該這樣做。
但就像震驚一樣，無(wú)所作為的一年已經(jīng)過(guò)去。相關(guān)的問題是我們將來(lái)會(huì)去哪里？這讓我們回到了這個(gè)問題：停留這么久本身是否是額外的刺激，會(huì)導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹？或者，假設(shè)財(cái)政沖擊已經(jīng)結(jié)束，在下一次沖擊到來(lái)之前，通脹會(huì)自行消失嗎？
我在這里繪制了美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在 3 月 15 日會(huì)議上對(duì)失業(yè)率、聯(lián)邦基金利率和通脹的預(yù)測(cè)。 美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)認(rèn)為，在沒有高實(shí)際利率時(shí)期的情況下，通脹將自行發(fā)展。 我認(rèn)為，這是我們大多數(shù)評(píng)論員不同意的中心前提。到m，在實(shí)際利率大幅偏低或?yàn)樨?fù)的時(shí)期將加速通貨膨脹。他們會(huì)說(shuō)，這些預(yù)測(cè)是瘋狂的。但他們真的瘋了嗎？
The markets, by the way, seem to agree with the Fed. Until the Fed started saying it’s going to move, markets also seemed to think inflation would go away all on its own.
Well, one thing John emphasizes is to write down models. So I wrote down a model, so simple it can show up in the bottom of a slide. It says that output is lower when the real interest rate is higher, and a Phillips curve in which inflation depends on the output gap. Crucially, this model uses adaptive expectations in the Phillips and IS curves, as shown by the arrows.
Then I asked the question, let us start at last year’s inflation, where the Fed projections start; assume the shocks are over, but we inherit this inflation. What happens if the Fed follows the blue line, the federal funds rate? The initial inflation is given. The blue line is given. From the model, I calculate where inflation and unemployment go from there. The dashed lines are the Fed’s projections.
I think this graph encapsulates the view the Fed is way behind the curve; that low interest rates below inflation constitute additional stimulus. Inflation spirals off, at least until it gives in, raises rates sharply and causes a recession, as Larry Summers warns. That looks pretty awful. And it looks like the Fed is completely wrong in its forecasts of what will happen if it follows this fund rate path.
But what if expectations are rational? Here’s a little modification of the model with the arrows pointing to the changes. What if, the real interest rate and the Phillips curve are centered at expected future inflation rather than lagged inflation? Same simulation: Put in the federal funds rate path, anchor inflation at last year’s inflation. Turn off all shocks. What happens? I obtain almost exactly what the Federal Reserve is projecting.
Intuitively, the rational expectations Phillips curve looks at inflation relative to future inflation. Unemployment is low, as it is today, when inflation is high relative to future inflation. Inflation high relative to future inflation means that inflation is declining. And that’s exactly what this projection says. Rational expectations means you solve models from future to present. If people thought inflation was really going to be high in the future, inflation would already be high today. The fact that it was only five percent tells us that it’s going to decline and go away.
To be clear I don’t think the Fed thinks this way procedurally. They have a gut instinct about inflation dynamics, informed by lots of VAR forecasts and model simulations. But this theory gives a pretty good as-if description, a slightly more micro founded model that makes sense of those intuitive beliefs.
So the Federal Reserve’s projections are not nuts! Inflation might just go away on its own! There is a model that describes the projections. And this is a perfectly standard model: it’s the new-Keynesian model that has been in the equations if not the prose of every academic and central bank research paper for 30 years. So, it is not completely nuts. Our job is to think about these two models and think about which one is right about the world.
To put the question in another way, let’s find what interest rate it takes to produce the Fed’s inflation projection. What should the Fed be doing? With adaptive expectations, to make inflation fade away as the Fed thinks will happen, we need the interest rate to be nine percent. Right now. Why? Because you need a high real interest rate measured relative to lagged inflation in order to bring that inflation down. And we’re way, way off the curve. I think this calculation encapsulates a lot of the Taylor rule view.
But what if inflation expectations are rational? Again I find what interest rate path, it takes to produce the Fed’s inflation path, Here, the Fed is a bit ahead of the curve.
A quick summary: The Fed’s projections are consistent with a standard New Keynesian model. This is not a nutty model. It’s been around since 1990. It’s the basis of essentially all academic macroeconomic theory. It may be wrong or right. The point of models is to help us understand what ingredients get to different views, and thereby also use evidence from other episodes to guide this one. I’m not advocating for against it. I’m just saying this is what we need to talk about.
Here are the core questions.
How forward looking are expectations in the bond market, in the economy, and in the Phillips curve? Do people think about expected inflation, about what’s going to happen next year? Or do they mechanically take whatever inflation happened last year?
In my view, the right answer is probably halfway in between. In the long run, people catch on. Why don’t we see the huge spiral? Because once we get to spiraling inflation, people catch on and get more rational in their expectations. In the short run, with a new event, there is likely some adaptive dyanmics. So don’t count on either one being perfectly right. But don’t count on either one being incredibly reliable either.
Another, more uncomfortable way of putting the question,
如果利率對(duì)過(guò)去通脹的反應(yīng)小于一對(duì)一， 經(jīng)濟(jì)是穩(wěn)定的還是不穩(wěn)定的？
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的預(yù)測(cè)稱，穩(wěn)定。如果我們不理會(huì)利率，最終通脹會(huì)平息下來(lái)。在此過(guò)程中可能會(huì)有很多短期動(dòng)態(tài)，這些模型沒有捕捉到這些動(dòng)態(tài)。但它最終安定下來(lái)。這回答了拉里的最后一個(gè)問題。這不一定是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。釷這是一個(gè)世界模型，在這個(gè)模型中，名義事物確實(shí)控制名義事物，名義利率最終會(huì)拖累通貨膨脹。k% 利率規(guī)則是可能的。不一定是最佳的，但可能。
第三，有一個(gè)重要的定量問題。
價(jià)格是否像美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)預(yù)測(cè)所暗示的那樣靈活，菲利普斯曲線是否陡峭？
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的預(yù)測(cè)表明通脹會(huì)很快下降。隱含地，價(jià)格非常靈活。也許不吧。
You may still think the Fed’s view is nutty, but there is now some important evidence on the table. That experience may have shifted the Fed’s view of inflation dynamics. The model of spiraling inflation and deflation also predicts that when interest rates are stuck at zero for 10 or 20 years, inflation or deflation will spiral away. And inflation didn’t do that. The Fed funds rate was stuck at zero in the US for nearly 10 years. Inflation just batted around with a stuck interest rate. In Europe, inflation was stable with a stuck interest rate for a longer period. And in Japan, inflation was stable with a stuck interest rate for 25 years. The deflation spiral never broke out. Japan lived 25 years of the Friedman optimum quantity of money. This experience may be is something that the Fed is digesting in its verbal way, and that is what the rational expectations model says. So it’s not as nuts.
Next, let’s think about how inflation is going to proceed in the future. In the Fed’s projections inflation comes down very quickly. To match that I had to take a price stickiness parameter of 0.5. That means a very steep Phillips curve. One percent output gap means one percent inflation. Most people think of the Phillips curve as having been quite flat. In the 2010s, unemployment moved a lot with little change in inflation. Today inflation is moving a lot with little change in unemployment. What is the real amount of price stickiness? Or is the whole Phillips curve a mess?
To get at this, and other issues, here is the response to a fiscal shock in the full equations of the standard new-Keynesian model. I add long-term debt, and I perform slightly unusual simulations: I ask how the model responds to a fiscal shock with no change in interest rate, and I ask how it responds to interest rate changes with no change in fiscal policy.
This is now a full shock simulation: Rather than take initial inflation as given, I hit the model with a 1% fiscal shock, no change in interest rate, and derive the entire inflation path. What happens? Inflation rises, and then does go away on its own.
This is the stanford three equation model. So it really is not nutty that inflation would go away on its own.
But it takes years for inflation to go away. I cut the price stickiness parameter in half, but I still have a pretty steep Phillips curve. Using the full model adds persistence. So the Fed may also be wrong in thinking that inflation will disappear on its own quite as quickly, even if the fiscal shock has ended (as it has in the simulation) and even given its view that inflation is stable in the long run.
A one-time fiscal shock can lead to drawn out inflation, not a one-time price-level jump. We may have a ways to go. In this model the 8% inflation we have just seen is only 40% of the eventual price-level rise.
Now, what can the Fed do about inflation? Suppose the Fed does start raising interest rates aggressively? Here I feed the model an AR(1) interest rate, with no fiscal policy shock, to evaluate the independent effect of monetary policy. Many models implicitly specify that when the Fed raises interest rates sthere’s a big increase in surpluses. We’re just going to leave fiscal policy alone and see what happens in what is the apparently Fed’s model, if the Fed raises interest rates.
The interest rate rise does lowers inflation, but only in the short run. There’s a form of Tom Sargent’s “unpleasant arithmetic”at work. Lowering inflation today raises inflation in the future. We had a fiscal shock. That has to come out of the pockets of bondholders, by inflating away bonds. The Fed can choose to inflate that away now or inflate it away in the future. But the Fed cannot get rid of the fact that there has been a fiscal shock which inflates away debt. So it has a limited power. It can smooth inflation but cannot completely get rid of inflation.
What if there is a 1% fiscal shock, but the Fed responds with something like a Taylor rule? We basically add the last two figures. We get lower inflation in the short run, but much more persistent inflation in the long run. Smoothing inflation is a great thing in this model. It reduces output volatility. (Output is related to inflation relative to future inflation, so has almost no movement here.)
We have one more reason for a Taylor rule: It does not give us stability, as it does in adaptive expectations models, it does not give us determinacy as it does in new-Keynesian models. It gives us quiet, the absence of volatility, which is perhaps the best of all.
Now let’s think about the further future. This is the CBO’s debt and deficit graph to remind you of our fiscal situation. We don’t have just a one-time $6 trillion helicopter drop, we have an ongoing fiscal problem. The CBO’s projection is debt if nothing bad happens. But every 10 years we have a shock, and the debt goes up again like a cliff.My little black line there is a guess of what happens with occasional shocks. In sum, we have five percent of GDP structural deficits, once per decade stimulus/bailouts, and here comes Social Security and Medicare.
If there isn’t more bad fiscal news, there are fiscal constraints of monetary policy. In 1980, there was only 25% debt to GDP ratio. Now it’s 100% and rising. We need coordinated fiscal and monetary policy to get out of a serious inflation. But the fiscal constraints on monetary policy are going to be four times harder this time.
How? First, there are interest costs on the debt. Suppose the Fed raises interest rates to five percent. We’ve been talking about eight, nine, ten percent, so five percent isn’t that much. But today five percent interest rate is five percent of GDP debt costs, a trillion bucks. If the Fed wants to raise real interest rates 5% to fight inflation, we need a fiscal contraction of a trillion dollars a year to pay those debt costs, or else raising interest rates does not stop the inflation.
Second, once inflation gets baked in to bond prices, then if we disinflate, the government has to pay bondholders a big windfall, by repaying debt in more valuable dollars. Ten percent disinflation and 100% debt to GDP ratio means a ten percent of GDP present from taxpayers to bondholders. If we don’t pay that, the monetary tightening will fail.
And we’ve seen that failure in Latin America. Countries get into fiscal problems, they have inflation, they raise interest rates, that just raises debt costs, and the inflation spirals on up.
這是該效果的模擬。在這里，我采用了一個(gè)完全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的新凱恩斯模型——沒有任何關(guān)于價(jià)格水平的財(cái)政理論。我問如果美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)按照虛線加息會(huì)發(fā)生什么？在左上角的圖表中，您看到利率上升而通脹下降。利率上升會(huì)降低通貨膨脹。但是，較高的名義利率和較低的通貨膨脹意味著較高的償債成本和對(duì)債券持有人的禮物。新凱恩斯主義模型認(rèn)為國(guó)會(huì)和政府“被動(dòng)地”提供無(wú)論如何都需要財(cái)政支持，但需要多少？標(biāo)題計(jì)算：這種通貨緊縮需要 GDP 財(cái)政盈余的 3.5%。
如果國(guó)會(huì)對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)說(shuō)：“你瘋了。我們不會(huì)那樣做?！?好吧，那它不可能發(fā)生。
在第二個(gè)模擬中，我遵循相同的利率路徑，但在新凱恩斯模型中，通過(guò)改變貨幣政策沖擊的時(shí)間序列模式，您可以在較少需要財(cái)政政策的情況下獲得相同的觀察利率。所以在這里，我有相同的利率路徑，但只有 2.3% 的 GDP 財(cái)政盈余來(lái)自國(guó)會(huì)。但你從中得到的通貨緊縮減少了。在右下角，國(guó)會(huì)只提供了 GDP 財(cái)政盈余的 0.91%。利率上升，但現(xiàn)在通脹根本不動(dòng)。仍然有盈余，因?yàn)槲覀內(nèi)匀恍枰Ц陡叩膶?shí)際利息成本。在右下角的情況下，較高的利率會(huì)提高通貨膨脹率。為什么？因?yàn)樵谶@種情況下，我們有赤字。
沒有協(xié)調(diào)的財(cái)政緊縮政策，提高利率不會(huì)降低通貨膨脹。即使在完全庫(kù)存的新凱恩斯模型中。
1980年呢？1980 年不僅僅是貨幣政策。1980 年是聯(lián)合貨幣、財(cái)政和微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)放松管制的改革。它引發(fā)了增長(zhǎng)的繁榮，從而引發(fā)了稅收的繁榮。這正是財(cái)政改革和緊縮。我在這里繪制了 1980 年之后的基本盈余。大多數(shù)“里根赤字”只是巨額債務(wù)的更高利息成本。到 1990 年代，您可以看到財(cái)政盈余激增?；艘欢螘r(shí)間，但伴隨著貨幣改革而來(lái)的是財(cái)政和放松管制改革（1982 年、1986 年）。無(wú)論是通過(guò)這些改革還是僅僅靠運(yùn)氣，增長(zhǎng)都起飛了，還清了很多債務(wù)。
你甚至可以在債務(wù)與 GDP 的比率中看到這一點(diǎn)，其中包括債務(wù)的利息成本。到 1990 年代，這些改革正在償還債務(wù)。
假設(shè)您在 1980 年以 15% 的收益率購(gòu)買債券。到 1990 年代后期，您以 4% 到 5% 的通貨膨脹率買回了這些債券。你得到了每年百分之十的實(shí)際回報(bào)率，這是納稅人提供的。由于納稅人的恩惠，許多債務(wù)以更高的利率滾動(dòng)。該圖還警告我們，債券收益率從來(lái)都不能很好地預(yù)測(cè)通脹。
The joint fiscal and monetary policy was absent in many Latin American countries. They raise interest rates, the deficits don’t get cured, and the whole thing falls apart. That could have happened in the US as well.
Last, I offer some good news. We’re forgetting a lot of the economics of the 1970s and 1980s. We can have painless disinflations. We keep talking as if we have to redo 1980, and endure a horrible recession. There is a way out. And the way out is to coordinate the fiscal, monetary, and micro economic reform to a durable new regime, move that expected inflation term in the Phillips curve, by having people convinced that it really is going down. Then we get a miraculous disinflation. It can happen. It does happen.
我舉三個(gè)例子。首先，請(qǐng)記住 1990 年代初的通脹目標(biāo)改革。這個(gè)是新西蘭。GST 符號(hào)標(biāo)志著商品和服務(wù)稅的上升。還有一套微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)放松管制改革。通脹目標(biāo)是一項(xiàng)聯(lián)合財(cái)政、微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)和貨幣改革。通貨膨脹像石頭一樣下降，根本沒有衰退。央行從來(lái)不需要利用其獨(dú)立性來(lái)重演美國(guó) 1980 年。事實(shí)證明，這不是通脹目標(biāo)的重點(diǎn)！
加拿大在 1990 年代初也做了同樣的事情。通脹目標(biāo)不只是“親愛的加拿大儲(chǔ)備銀行，請(qǐng)更加嚴(yán)厲”。這也是財(cái)政部的一項(xiàng)承諾，“如果有必要，我們將提高稅收以償還我們的債務(wù)，而且只有這個(gè)通貨膨脹的價(jià)值。” 它還包括微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)改革。通貨膨脹逐漸消退，就像加拿大 7 月中旬的 雪一樣。
當(dāng)然，正如湯姆薩金特告訴我們的，記住惡性通貨膨脹的著名結(jié)局。即使利率下降，即使印制更多貨幣，即使短期赤字增加，通貨膨脹也會(huì)停止，因?yàn)楦鲊?guó)解決了結(jié)構(gòu)性財(cái)政問題。
如果我們到了需要去通脹的地步，請(qǐng)記住，所有成功的去通脹，包括 1980 年的美國(guó)，都是聯(lián)合貨幣、財(cái)政和微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)。但他們必須改革為可信、持久、時(shí)間一致的政權(quán)。你無(wú)法為擺脫通貨膨脹提供指導(dǎo)。你不能只發(fā)表更多關(guān)于“錨定”的演講。
還記得“ W IN”（W hip Inflation Now w）按鈕嗎？當(dāng)我們重播1970 年代時(shí)，它們可能會(huì)回來(lái)。當(dāng)然，它們是對(duì)病房指導(dǎo)或期望管理的最終嘗試，但沒有奏效。你需要對(duì)政權(quán)進(jìn)行持久的改變，以便人們了解根本的財(cái)政問題得到了解決。
但回到厄運(yùn)和陰霾。我們將面臨新的財(cái)政沖擊，遲早會(huì)發(fā)生不好的事情，而且我們的財(cái)政空間很小。如果（何時(shí)？）中國(guó)入侵臺(tái)灣，我們將面臨巨大的金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊，以及一場(chǎng)惡戰(zhàn)。政府將嘗試借入或印制另外 5 至 10 萬(wàn)億美元來(lái)紓困、刺激、保障和打一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。最重要的是，比如說(shuō) 150% 的 GDP 債務(wù)和未改革的權(quán)利?？吹絯會(huì)很有趣帽子發(fā)生了。
在我的閱讀中，我們已經(jīng)越過(guò)了盧比孔河。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)人們不再想要我們的債務(wù)，開始花錢，并導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹。我們現(xiàn)在是否處于財(cái)政極限，無(wú)法再次實(shí)施大規(guī)模的赤字融資刺激計(jì)劃？或者人們，人們是否認(rèn)為未來(lái)的赤字將通過(guò)未來(lái)更多的盈余來(lái)償還，并且他們會(huì)很高興地在沒有通貨膨脹 的情況下借出這些萬(wàn)億美元？
所以這里是未知的理論問題編號(hào) t w o。
財(cái)政通脹是存量現(xiàn)象還是流動(dòng)現(xiàn)象？赤字與 GDP 差距，還是債務(wù)與預(yù)期還款？
我認(rèn)為拉里薩默斯的愿景，優(yōu)美的表達(dá)，是一個(gè)流動(dòng)的限制。赤字乘以 1.5 不應(yīng)大于 GDP 缺口。如果是這樣，你就會(huì)得到通貨膨脹。只要赤字流量低于此值，就不要擔(dān)心增加債務(wù)；我們總是可以遲早還清的 。
我在這里表達(dá)的觀點(diǎn)是，觀點(diǎn)的看法。我們是從現(xiàn)在開始說(shuō)的，當(dāng)時(shí)是對(duì)政府未來(lái)的債權(quán)可能是當(dāng)時(shí)的那樣。可能的變化，也會(huì)給我們帶來(lái)財(cái)政問題。
我們有很好的基本問題。讓我們討論答案。
恰恰
