Why didn't Spain go to war with the Chinese Ming dynasty?
為什么16世紀(jì)的西班牙不與明朝開戰(zhàn)？
The Spanish leadership in the Philippines seriously considered a major invasion of China in 1586 with 20–25,000 men, half of whom would be fresh Spanish troops and the rest split half and half between Filipinos and Japanese mercenaries. This force was supposed to land in Fujian Province and then make the long 1,500 mile march to Beijing to decapitate the Imperial government. However, the Spanish did have some understanding of the task before them, with the plan emphasizing the need to preserve the existing government system to rule through; they evidently understood that the best way to conquer China was to keep the current method of ruling while simply switching out the Ming Dynasty for the Spanish.
1586年，西班牙在菲律賓的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層曾認(rèn)真考慮過對中國進(jìn)行一次大規(guī)模侵略，當(dāng)時計劃動員2萬—— 2.5萬人，其中一半是新到的西班牙軍隊，另一半則由菲律賓人和日本雇傭兵各占一半。這支部隊原計劃在福建省登陸，然后長途跋涉1500英里，來到北京，直擊帝國政府中心。
西班牙人確實了解任務(wù)的目的，該計劃強調(diào)有必要維持中國現(xiàn)有的政府制度，以便進(jìn)行統(tǒng)治;他們顯然明白，征服中國的最好辦法是保持目前的統(tǒng)治方式，也就是說，在保持運行方式不變的的同時，把統(tǒng)治者由老朱家換成西班牙王室。
At this point, it is worthwhile to examine some contemporary conflicts between the Ming and the West. In the early 1500’s, the Portuguese fought multiple naval battles with the Ming over the kidnapping of Chinese children as slaves and were defeated each time. A century later, the Dutch built a massive maritime network in East Asia and attempted to force the Ming into trade on Dutch terms
在這一點上，我們有必要研究一下當(dāng)代中西之間的一些沖突。早在15世紀(jì)初，葡萄牙人就綁架中國兒童奴隸問題與明朝進(jìn)行了多次海戰(zhàn)，每次都以失敗告終。一個世紀(jì)后，荷蘭人在東亞建立了一個龐大的海上網(wǎng)絡(luò)，并試圖迫使明朝按照荷蘭的條件進(jìn)行貿(mào)易。
The Dutch were defeated in a war from 1622–1624 while being forced to withdraw from fortifications they built on the Pescadores Islands between China and Taiwan. Conflict again flared up in 1633 when the Dutch were defeated at Liaoluo Bay, losing 100 sailors, and then again three decades later when Ming loyalists fleeing the Manchus seized the Dutch colony in Taiwan altogether.
1622年至1624年，荷蘭人在一場戰(zhàn)爭中戰(zhàn)敗，被迫從中國大陸和臺灣之間的澎湖列島上撤出。1633年，沖突再次爆發(fā)，荷蘭人在遼羅灣戰(zhàn)敗，失去了100名船員。三十年后，明朝的效忠者（鄭成功）逃離滿族，占領(lǐng)了當(dāng)時的荷蘭殖民地——臺灣
This impressive track record implies the Ming would have swatted the Spanish aside with ease, but it hides the immense difficulties of each of these conflicts; even in the early 16th century conflicts with the Portuguese, Ming admirals acknowledged that their foes both had more maneuverable ships and better cannon than anything available to China at the time.
這一令人印象深刻的歷史記錄意味著，當(dāng)時的明朝會輕而易舉地將這點西班牙人一巴掌拍飛，但在沖突之下也隱藏著危機;即在16世紀(jì)初與葡萄牙的沖突中，明朝的將領(lǐng)們也承認(rèn)他們的敵人擁有比當(dāng)時中國操縱性更好的船只和更好的大炮。
Rather than technological superiority, the Ming found victory through massive numerical advantages and shrewd tactics in their engagements. Even then, the European fleets could still usually retreat with most of their ships intact. A Spanish expedition would enjoy a qualitative advantage, although not an overwhelming one.
明朝不是憑借技術(shù)上的優(yōu)勢，而是憑借數(shù)量上的巨大優(yōu)勢和作戰(zhàn)中的精明戰(zhàn)術(shù)取得了勝利。即便如此，歐洲艦隊通常仍可以在大部分船只完好無損的情況下撤退。一支西班牙探險隊將在質(zhì)量上享有優(yōu)勢，盡管不是戰(zhàn)斗中的壓倒性優(yōu)勢。
Besides actual military discrepancies, the Ming bureaucracy by the end of the 16th century suffered from mind numbing inefficiencies. When Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea in 1592 with over 100,000 men, his forces nearly conquered the peninsula before the Chinese governor of neighboring Liaoding Province sent 5,000 men to the defense of Pyongyang.
除了軍事上的實際差異，明朝的官僚機構(gòu)在16世紀(jì)末還遭遇了令人麻木的低效。1592年日本豐臣秀吉率領(lǐng)10多萬人入侵朝鮮時，日本的軍隊幾乎占領(lǐng)了朝鮮半島，不知情況的中國遼東總督只派出了5000人保衛(wèi)平壤
This small force was easily defeated and it would be months more before the Imperial Court itself satisfactorily completed a fact finding mission and then assembled its army. It wasn’t until 1593, more than half a year after the Japanese overran much of Korea, that the Ming seriously intervened in the war and began rolling back the Japanese
毫無疑問，
這支小部隊很快就被擊潰了，明朝政府完成了一項慘痛的事實調(diào)查任務(wù)，開始集結(jié)它的軍隊，在此期間又花了幾個月的時間。直到1593年，也就是日本占領(lǐng)朝鮮大部分地區(qū)半年多之后，明朝才真正介入戰(zhàn)爭，并最終擊退日本
Although the Ming army was still powerful, it moved to war at a lugubrious pace, a huge boon to a fast moving Spanish expedition. The Imperial Board of War responded even more poorly to local raids, which is what the Spanish invasion would have almost certainly been categorized as initially
雖然當(dāng)時的明朝軍隊仍然強大，但他們投入戰(zhàn)爭的速度令人沮喪，這對一支擅長快速行進(jìn)的西班牙探險隊來說是一個巨大的機遇。至于明帝國的衛(wèi)所兵對待突然發(fā)生的襲擊時，那反應(yīng)就更差了。
In 1555, a band of less than 100 Wakou pirates ravaged the lands around the former capital of Nanjing for nearly 3 months before they were put down. Before the end of the fiasco, perhaps 4,000 people were killed by this tiny band which was supposed to have been stopped by the 120,000 strong garrison around Nanjing. However, a result of the corruption of the late Ming meant most of these supposed troops didn’t exist; they were only listed so that commanding officers could collect extra salaries.
1555年，一群不到100人的倭寇洗劫了明朝前首都南京附近的區(qū)域，將近3個月才被消滅。在這場慘敗結(jié)束之前，這支本來應(yīng)該駐扎在南京周邊負(fù)責(zé)護(hù)衛(wèi)的12萬駐軍，卻被殺死了大約4000人。然而，由于明朝晚期的腐敗，這些所謂的軍隊大多不存在;他們作為一個個空洞的名字被列在名單上，只是為了軍官們能撈到額外的油水。
Despite these crippling weaknesses, the Ming proved that it could still send over 100,000 men to competently defend an ally against a serious enemy during the war with Japan. It would undoubtedly be able to muster more men to defend against a Spanish army speeding for Beijing.
盡管有這些致命的弱點，明朝還是證明了它仍然可以派出10多萬人，在與日本的戰(zhàn)爭中很好地保衛(wèi)盟友，對抗一個強大的敵人。毫無疑問，它將能夠召集更多的兵力，抵御快速向北京逼近的西班牙軍隊
As a result, the Spanish wouldn’t have had much of a chance of conquering China, but they would have gotten surprisingly far, not through their own skill, but through the sheer incompetence of the Ming government.
結(jié)果，西班牙人沒有多少機會征服中國，但他們卻一直在向前進(jìn)步，不是因為自己的技能有多么厲害，而是無能的明朝政府作為反面教材襯托的好。
Richard Stanfield
It was largely a timing issue. While invasion was considered at one point (as mentioned in another answer), the Spanish Empire’s zenith came and went before Ming was well and truly vulnerable. During the 17th century, the one in which the Ming dynasty would come to an end, the Spanish Governor of the Philippines wrote saying effectively “give me at dozen galleons and ten-thousand men and I will give you China.” The Ming dynasty if I recall correctly was presently embroiled in conflict with the Manchu’s that would in a few decades replace them.
這在很大程度上是一個時機問題。，在明朝真正步入衰弱的時候，西班牙帝國的鼎盛時期就已經(jīng)結(jié)束了。在17世紀(jì)，也就是明朝即將結(jié)束的那個世紀(jì)初，西班牙駐菲律賓總督寫道:“給我十幾門大炮，一萬個人，我就給你一個中國?！薄叭绻覜]記錯的話，明朝當(dāng)時正與滿族人發(fā)生沖突，幾十年后滿族人就會取而代之?！?/span>
However, that time coincided with the unsuccessful wars against the Dutch, and against France, in the 80 years war and 30 years war respectively
然而，與此同時，在80年戰(zhàn)爭和30年戰(zhàn)爭中，西班牙在對荷蘭和對法國的戰(zhàn)爭中都遭遇了失敗
However, if 17th century Spain had the resources and audacity of her 16th century self, subjugating much of the Chinese coastline would not have been out of her reach
然而，如果17世紀(jì)的西班牙擁有16世紀(jì)時的資源和膽識，征服中國的大部分海岸線也不會超出他的能力范圍
Constantine Lovos,
further to the remarks others have already made I must observe the following:
Despite the obvious advantage of muskets it would never have been enough to offset tens of thousands of Chinese archers. The sheer numerical superiority of the Chinese would have been impossible to overcome at this stage.
除了其他人已經(jīng)說過的話之外，我還必須指出:
盡管火繩槍有明顯的優(yōu)勢，但它永遠(yuǎn)不足以抵消數(shù)萬名中國弓箭手。中國在數(shù)量上的絕對優(yōu)勢在那個時候是不可能被克服的。
Geography. The Europeans were aware that the Chinese hinterland was vast, which was enough to deter them, but they did not have a reliable map which only served to deter them further.
地理位置。歐洲人知道中國的腹地廣闊，這足以阻止他們，他們更沒有一張可靠的地圖，所以困難更大。
要攻打中國的城池和要塞，所需的兵力根本無法提供。
The forces that would be required to storm Chinese walled and/or fortified cities (of which the Europeans were aware) were simply not available.
Logistics. Even the Spanish or the Dutch for that reason must have understood that supply lines would be required to advance into China. That would be a sheer impossibility
后勤。即便是西班牙或荷蘭，出于這個原因，也必須明白，要進(jìn)入中國，就必須有漫長的供應(yīng)線。這在當(dāng)時是完全不可能的
Ross Bundy
The logistics for Spain to invade China were simply too great.
西班牙入侵中國需要的后勤支持實在是太龐大了
in areas where they held significant technological advantage like the areas you state. Trade with the Ming Dynasty was what financed the Spanish Empire. The Ming Dynasty produced the most and best products in the world at the time and their primary means of exchange was silver. Spain mined gold and silver in the Americas, kept the gold for their own finances, and used the silver to buy Ming products that they then resold for more gold in Europe. Even if it weren't nearly logistically impossible for the Spanish to do anything against China, it would also have been severely economically damaging for them to do so.
西班牙與明朝的貿(mào)易是為了給西班牙帝國提供了資金。明朝生產(chǎn)了當(dāng)時世界上最多最好的產(chǎn)品，他們的主要交換工具是白銀。西班牙在美洲開采黃金和白銀，將黃金用于自己的財政，然后用這些白銀購買明朝的產(chǎn)品，然后在歐洲以更高的價格轉(zhuǎn)售。一來西班牙人因為后勤的限制幾乎不可能對中國采取任何行動，二來這樣做也會對他們的經(jīng)濟造成嚴(yán)重?fù)p害。
Joss Farino
One of the reasons is China's way too far to have a big war with them; is not worth it, the Ming even though behind in technology they weren't that behind and they still possessed resources to make and nice size military. Also other European superpowers such as the French, or the Dutch, or even down east not a super power but still a Empire the Ottomans; they may take advantage of Spain having a full fledge war against Ming.
其中一個原因是西班牙離中國太遠(yuǎn)了，西班牙不能和他們打一場大仗;這是不值得的，明朝雖然在技術(shù)上有些落后，但差距并不大，他們?nèi)匀粨碛兄圃熨Y源和集結(jié)強大軍事力量的能力。
而且當(dāng)時還有其他歐洲超級大國，如法國，荷蘭，甚至在東部還盤踞著奧斯曼帝國;他們都可能會在西班牙對明朝的全面戰(zhàn)爭中虎視眈眈。
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