A special report on financial risk
金融危機特別報道
The gods strike back
天威重返
Financial risk got ahead of the world’s ability to manage it. Matthew Valencia asks if it can be tamed again
金融風(fēng)險已經(jīng)超出人們的控制范圍。馬修·瓦倫西亞在討論風(fēng)險能夠重新被人們駕馭么
Feb 11th 2010 | From The Economist print edition
譯者：tinawang
“THE revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modern times and the past is the mastery of risk: the notion that the future is more than a whim of the gods and that men and women are not passive before nature.” So wrote Peter Bernstein in his seminal history of risk, “Against the Gods”, published in 1996. And so it seemed, to all but a few Cassandras, for much of the decade that followed. Finance enjoyed a golden period, with low interest rates, low volatility and high returns. Risk seemed to have been reduced to a permanently lower level.
“界定現(xiàn)在和過去的革命思想是對風(fēng)險的掌握：未來不是上帝的一時興趣，人類在自然界面前不是全然被動的。” 彼得·伯恩斯坦在其1996年出版的對風(fēng)險具有劃時代意義的“與上帝抗?fàn)帯币粫袑懙?。過去十年間，除了對于少數(shù)預(yù)言家，他的話在大多數(shù)人看來都是正確的。金融業(yè)經(jīng)歷了一個黃金時期，在這個時期的特點是低利率，低波動性和高回報率。風(fēng)險似乎已減至一個永久的較低水平。
This purported new paradigm hinged, in large part, on three closely linked developments: the huge growth of derivatives; the decomposition and distribution of credit risk through securitisation; and the formidable combination of mathematics and computing power in risk management that had its roots in academic work of the mid-20th century. It blossomed in the 1990s at firms such as Bankers Trust and JPMorgan, which developed “value-at-risk” (VAR), a way for banks to calculate how much they could expect to lose when things got really rough.
這可能是一個新的有聯(lián)系的范式，在很大程度上，是由三個關(guān)系緊密的階段體現(xiàn)的：衍生工具的大幅增多；通過證券化來分解和分散信用風(fēng)險；以及植根于20世紀(jì)中期的學(xué)術(shù)成果的數(shù)學(xué)和計算科學(xué)在風(fēng)險管理方面的強大組合。這項技術(shù)在20世紀(jì)90年代蓬勃發(fā)展起來，以信托銀行和JP摩根為代表的公司發(fā)展了風(fēng)險價值模型（VAR），這個模型使得銀行能夠計算他們在風(fēng)險真正到來之后的預(yù)期損失。
Suddenly it seemed possible for any financial risk to be measured to five decimal places, and for expected returns to be adjusted accordingly. Banks hired hordes of PhD-wielding “quants” to fine-tune ever more complex risk models. The belief took hold that, even as profits were being boosted by larger balance sheets and greater leverage (borrowing), risk was being capped by a technological shift.
突然之間，貌似所有的金融風(fēng)險都可以精確的預(yù)計到小數(shù)點后五位，相應(yīng)的，預(yù)期收益也可以預(yù)計到這個精度。銀行雇傭了一大群圖有博士之表的“quants”（譯者注：指從事計量金融研究者）對更為復(fù)雜的金融模型進行微調(diào)。大家都相信，即使利潤被更加強大的資產(chǎn)負債表和更高的杠桿率（借入）進一步推高，風(fēng)險似乎由于技術(shù)的發(fā)展而被限制在一定水平之內(nèi)。
There was something self-serving about this. The more that risk could be calibrated, the greater the opportunity to turn debt into securities that could be sold or held in trading books, with lower capital charges than regular loans. Regulators accepted this, arguing that the “great moderation” had subdued macroeconomic dangers and that securitisation had chopped up individual firms’ risks into manageable lumps. This faith in the new, technology-driven order was reflected in the Basel 2 bank-capital rules, which relied heavily on the banks’ internal models.
這給人以謀私利的空間。風(fēng)險校的越準(zhǔn)，將債務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)化成能夠在交易賬戶中持有，且其費用低于正常貸款的資本費用的證券的機會就越大。監(jiān)管者也認同這點，他們認為“大穩(wěn)健”減弱了宏觀經(jīng)濟風(fēng)險，而證券化將公司的獨立風(fēng)險削減到到可控狀態(tài)。巴塞爾協(xié)議2的銀行資本規(guī)所反映出的信念以新的技術(shù)為前導(dǎo)規(guī)范，這個協(xié)議嚴(yán)重依賴銀行的內(nèi)部模型。
There were bumps along the way, such as the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund, and the dotcom bust, but each time markets recovered relatively quickly. Banks grew cocky. But that sense of security was destroyed by the meltdown of 2007-09, which as much as anything was a crisis of modern metrics-based risk management. The idea that markets can be left to police themselves turned out to be the world’s most expensive mistake, requiring $15 trillion in capital injections and other forms of support. “It has cost a lot to learn how little we really knew,” says a senior central banker. Another lesson was that managing risk is as much about judgment as about numbers. Trying ever harder to capture risk in mathematical formulae can be counterproductive if such a degree of accuracy is intrinsically unattainable.
前進的道路上亦有坎坷，比如說長期資本管理公司（LTCM）和對沖基金的近乎崩潰，網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫，但是每一次，市場總能快速恢復(fù)。銀行妄自尊大。但是這種安全感被2007年09月的金融崩潰所打破，這場金融危機在某種程度上其實是以現(xiàn)代數(shù)量經(jīng)濟學(xué)為基礎(chǔ)的風(fēng)險管理的危機。市場能夠自治觀點是全球經(jīng)濟最嚴(yán)重的錯誤，所付出的代價是高達15萬億的資金注入和一些其他形式的援助?！拔覀兏冻鰜砭薮蟮拇鷥r才意識到了自己的無知”，一位資深的央行行長說到。另一個教訓(xùn)是我們對風(fēng)險管理的認識僅僅停留在數(shù)字層面。如果我們對于計算結(jié)果的精確度在本質(zhì)上是無法把握的，那么這種竭力去在數(shù)學(xué)公式中量化風(fēng)險程度的方法很可能起到反作用。
For now, the hubris of spurious precision has given way to humility. It turns out that in financial markets “black swans”, or extreme events, occur much more often than the usual probability models suggest. Worse, finance is becoming more fragile: these days blow-ups are twice as frequent as they were before the first world war, according to Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley and Michael Bordo of Rutgers University. Benoit Mandelbrot, the father of fractal theory and a pioneer in the study of market swings, argues that finance is prone to a “wild” randomness not usually seen in nature. In markets, “rare big changes can be more significant than the sum of many small changes,” he says. If financial markets followed the normal bell-shaped distribution curve, in which meltdowns are very rare, the stockmarket crash of 1987, the interest-rate turmoil of 1992 and the 2008 crash would each be expected only once in the lifetime of the universe.
目前，虛假的精度所引起的妄尊已被謙卑所取代。目前看來，金融市場的“黑天鵝”或者說一些極端事件所發(fā)生的頻率，比通常的概率模型所預(yù)測的要大得多。更糟糕的是，資本變得更加的脆弱：加州大學(xué)伯克利分校的巴里·艾森格林和羅格斯大學(xué)的邁克爾·波爾多認為，現(xiàn)在的金融市場危機發(fā)生的頻率是第一次世界大戰(zhàn)之前的兩倍。分形幾何理論的創(chuàng)始人同時也是市場波動研究的先驅(qū)伯努瓦·曼特羅伯認為金融傾向于一種“野性的”隨機，而不是我們在自然界中所常見到的那種隨機。在市場中，“罕見的大變化所造成的影響要比很多小的變化加總所帶來的影響要大得多，”他說道。如果金融市場能夠遵從正態(tài)分布曲線，那危機就是及其罕見的了，1987年的股市崩潰，1992年的利率風(fēng)暴和2008年的金融危機，在宇宙形成到現(xiàn)在這么長時間里，估計只能夠預(yù)見到一次。
This is changing the way many financial firms think about risk, says Greg Case, chief executive of Aon, an insurance broker. Before the crisis they were looking at things like pandemics, cyber-security and terrorism as possible causes of black swans. Now they are turning to risks from within the system, and how they can become amplified in combination.
這改變了許多公司對風(fēng)險的態(tài)度，克雷格·凱斯說到，他是保險經(jīng)紀(jì)公司安怡的首席行政長官。在危機爆發(fā)之前，大人都認為黑天鵝時間的可能原因會是大規(guī)模流行病，網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全和恐怖主義。現(xiàn)在，我們轉(zhuǎn)向系統(tǒng)內(nèi)部尋找誘因，以及這些內(nèi)因和外因是如何相互作用，引起放大結(jié)果的。
Cheap as chips, and just as bad for you
廉價害人似薯片
It would, though, be simplistic to blame the crisis solely, or even mainly, on sloppy risk managers or wild-eyed quants. Cheap money led to the wholesale underpricing of risk; America ran negative real interest rates in 2002-05, even though consumer-price inflation was quiescent. Plenty of economists disagree with the recent assertion by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, that the crisis had more to do with lax regulation of mortgage products than loose monetary policy.
但是，把危機歸咎于危機本身，甚至把主要責(zé)任推卸在碌碌無為的風(fēng)險管理這和狂熱激進的quants身上就顯得太簡單了。廉價資本導(dǎo)致了大規(guī)模的風(fēng)險低估；在2002年5月，美國的實際利率為負，盡管如此，美國的消費者物價通脹率還是沒變。很多經(jīng)濟學(xué)家不認同聯(lián)邦儲備委員會主席本·伯南克的言論，伯南克認為，危機的原因絕大部分是由于按揭貸款產(chǎn)品的監(jiān)管缺失，而非寬松的貨幣政策。
Equally damaging were policies to promote home ownership in America using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the country’s two mortgage giants. They led the duo to binge on securities backed by shoddily underwritten loans.
同樣有危害性的政策是政府鼓勵美國居民向房地美和房利美申請按揭貸款，這兩家公司是美國按揭貸款業(yè)的巨頭。政策使得兩房深陷由粗制濫造的承銷貸款包裝成的證券的泥潭。
In the absence of strict limits, higher leverage followed naturally from low interest rates. The debt of America’s financial firms ballooned relative to the overall economy (see chart 1). At the peak of the madness, the median large bank had borrowings of 37 times its equity, meaning it could be wiped out by a loss of just 2-3% of its assets. Borrowed money allowed investors to fake “alpha”, or above-market returns, says Benn Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations.
監(jiān)管的缺失更加導(dǎo)致了由低利率衍生出的高杠桿率。美國金融公司的債務(wù)占整個GDP的比重在膨脹（見圖表1）。在經(jīng)濟瘋狂的高峰期，大型銀行負債權(quán)益比的中位值是38，這代表著它們可能在資產(chǎn)損失2-3%的情況下，就面臨破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險。借入資本能夠使得投資者們偽造“alpha”值，換句話來說，就是得到高于市場回報率的回報，美國外交關(guān)系委員會的本恩·斯泰爾說到。
The agony was compounded by the proliferation of short-term debt to support illiquid long-term assets, much of it issued beneath the regulatory radar in highly leveraged “shadow” banks, such as structured investment vehicles. When markets froze, sponsoring entities, usually banks, felt morally obliged to absorb their losses. “Reputation risk was shown to have a very real financial price,” says Doug Roeder of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, an American regulator.
這種恐慌又由支持低流動性的長期資產(chǎn)所大量發(fā)行的短期債務(wù)所加劇，而那些短期借款往往是由監(jiān)管范圍之外的高杠桿率的“影子”銀行所發(fā)行的，比如說結(jié)構(gòu)性投資工具。當(dāng)市場低迷時，作為贊助實體的銀行通常會覺得在道義上有義務(wù)承擔(dān)他們的損失?！奥曌u上的損失有明顯而且非?，F(xiàn)實的經(jīng)濟代價，”美國貨幣監(jiān)理署的道格·羅德如是說。
Everywhere you looked, moreover, incentives were misaligned. Firms deemed “too big to fail” nestled under implicit guarantees. Sensitivity to risk was dulled by the “Greenspan put”, a belief that America’s Federal Reserve would ride to the rescue with lower rates and liquidity support if needed. Scrutiny of borrowers was delegated to rating agencies, who were paid by the debt-issuers. Some products were so complex, and the chains from borrower to end-investor so long, that thorough due diligence was impossible. A proper understanding of a typical collateralised debt obligation (CDO), a structured bundle of debt securities, would have required reading 30,000 pages of documentation.
更有甚者，放眼望去，激勵都是錯位的?！疤笠灾劣诓粫归]”成為了公司不言而喻的保障?！案窳炙古苏摺睖p弱了市場對風(fēng)險的敏感度，這個政策使得大眾相信美聯(lián)儲會在需要的時候，通過降低利率和減少市場流動性來救市。審核借款者的工作被下放給了信用評級機構(gòu)，這些信用評級機構(gòu)靠貸款發(fā)行者吃飯。一些金融產(chǎn)品過于復(fù)雜，而從借款人到最終投資者的鏈條又過長，所以進行徹底盡職的審查幾乎是不可能的。要了解一個典型的債務(wù)抵押債券（CDO），即結(jié)構(gòu)化的債務(wù)證券包，需要閱讀多達30000頁的文件。
Fees for securitisers were paid largely upfront, increasing the temptation to originate, flog and forget. The problems with bankers’ pay went much wider, meaning that it was much better to be an employee than a shareholder (or, eventually, a taxpayer picking up the bail-out tab). The role of top executives’ pay has been overblown. Top brass at Lehman Brothers and American International Group (AIG) suffered massive losses when share prices tumbled. A recent study found that banks where chief executives had more of their wealth tied up in the firm performed worse, not better, than those with apparently less strong incentives. One explanation is that they took risks they thought were in shareholders’ best interests, but were proved wrong. Motives lower down the chain were more suspect. It was too easy for traders to cash in on short-term gains and skirt responsibility for any time-bombs they had set ticking.
證券發(fā)行者的傭金大部分都是提前支付的，這進一步加劇了證券發(fā)行者的發(fā)行證券行為，無意義的重復(fù)行為，以及好了傷疤忘了疼。銀行家薪酬問題越來越大，這意味著做雇員比做股東（或者說，最終作為一個擔(dān)起救市重任的納稅者）來說是更好的選擇。高管的高薪早已不那么穩(wěn)定了。雷曼兄弟和美國國際集團（AIG）的高管在股價大跳水時遭受了慘重的損失。最近的一項研究調(diào)查表明，相較起那些對高管的激勵不那么明顯的公司，財富與銀行表現(xiàn)聯(lián)系更加緊密的銀行高管表現(xiàn)的更差，而不是更好。對這種現(xiàn)象的一種解釋就是，銀行的高管認為他們所冒的風(fēng)險是符合股東最關(guān)心的利益的，但事實證明并非如此。減短從借款者到最終投資者的鏈條的動機是可疑的。對于交易商來說，賺取短期利得和避開它們所設(shè)定的定時炸彈是在容易不過的了。
Asymmetries wreaked havoc in the vast over-the-counter derivatives market, too, where even large dealing firms lacked the information to determine the consequences of others failing. Losses on contracts linked to Lehman turned out to be modest, but nobody knew that when it collapsed in September 2008, causing panic. Likewise, it was hard to gauge the exposures to “tail” risks built up by sellers of swaps on CDOs such as AIG and bond insurers. These were essentially put options, with limited upside and a low but real probability of catastrophic losses.
信息不對稱造成了場外衍生品市場極大的破壞，在場外市場，甚至連大型交易公司都無法估計其他公司倒閉造成的后果。與雷曼兄弟有關(guān)的合同損失看起來并不是太劇烈，但是沒有人能夠預(yù)見雷曼在2008年9月倒閉時所引起的恐慌。同樣，例如AIG和其他債券保險商所發(fā)行的CDO互換的“尾部”風(fēng)險的暴露也很難估計。這些本質(zhì)上都是看跌期權(quán)，潛在利潤有限，產(chǎn)生災(zāi)難性損失的概率雖小但確實存在。
Another factor in the build-up of excessive risk was what Andy Haldane, head of financial stability at the Bank of England, has described as “disaster myopia”. Like drivers who slow down after seeing a crash but soon speed up again, investors exercise greater caution after a disaster, but these days it takes less than a decade to make them reckless again. Not having seen a debt-market crash since 1998, investors piled into ever riskier securities in 2003-07 to maintain yield at a time of low interest rates. Risk-management models reinforced this myopia by relying too heavily on recent data samples with a narrow distribution of outcomes, especially in subprime mortgages.
造成過度風(fēng)險的另一個因素是英格蘭銀行主管公司金融穩(wěn)定的安迪·霍爾丹所說的“災(zāi)難短視”。如同那些由于看到車禍而減速但在后來又提速的司機，投資者在危機后的一段時間會變得十分謹慎，但這段謹慎期往往不超過10年，之后，投資者又會變得冒進了。由于沒有看到債券市場在1998年的暴跌，為了在低利率時期保持收益，在2003年7月投資者們的資金都流向了更有風(fēng)險的證券。風(fēng)險管理模型由于過于依賴近期的數(shù)據(jù)樣本加劇了這種短視，而這些數(shù)據(jù)樣本的分布結(jié)果過窄，特別是在次級抵押貸款模型方面。
A further hazard was summed up by the assertion in 2007 by Chuck Prince, then Citigroup’s boss, that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.” Performance is usually judged relative to rivals or to an industry benchmark, encouraging banks to mimic each other’s risk-taking, even if in the long run it benefits no one. In mortgages, bad lenders drove out good ones, keeping up with aggressive competitors for fear of losing market share. A few held back, but it was not easy: when JPMorgan sacrificed five percentage points of return on equity in the short run, it was lambasted by shareholders who wanted it to “catch up” with zippier-looking rivals.
2007年，當(dāng)時的花旗集團老板恰克·普林斯認為危害又加重了一層，他說道“一旦音樂響起，我們就不得不去跳舞?！睂τ诠颈憩F(xiàn)的判斷往往是基于競爭對手的表現(xiàn)或者行業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這種判斷鼓勵銀行去模仿彼此的冒險行為，即使從長遠來看，這對任何公司都沒有好處。在抵押貸款市場，劣幣驅(qū)逐良幣，那些信用低的貸款者另每家銀行都因害怕失去市場份額而追趕者冒進的競爭對手。一些銀行收手了，但是這并不容易：當(dāng)摩根大通犧牲5個百分點的短期回報時，遭到了股東的職責(zé)，這些股東希望公司能夠盡快“趕超”那些來勢洶洶的競爭對手。
An overarching worry is that the complexity of today’s global financial network makes occasional catastrophic failure inevitable. For example, the market for credit derivatives galloped far ahead of its supporting infrastructure. Only now are serious moves being made to push these contracts through central clearing-houses which ensure that trades are properly collateralised and guarantee their completion if one party defaults.
另一個非常重要的令人擔(dān)憂的因素是由于現(xiàn)在的全球金融網(wǎng)絡(luò)的復(fù)雜性使得偶然性的災(zāi)難性失敗變得難以避免。比如說，信用衍生品市場遙遙領(lǐng)跑于其基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。直到現(xiàn)在，才采取了嚴(yán)厲的措施，這些合同必須通過中央結(jié)算所的審核，以確保交易是有擔(dān)保的，以及在一方違約的情況下保證交易能夠正常完成。
Network overload
超負荷網(wǎng)絡(luò)
The push to allocate capital ever more efficiently over the past 20 years created what Till Guldimann, the father of VAR and vice-chairman of SunGard, a technology firm, calls “capitalism on steroids”. Banks got to depend on the modelling of prices in esoteric markets to gauge risks and became adept at gaming the rules. As a result, capital was not being spread around as efficiently as everyone believed.
過去的20年內(nèi)，業(yè)界為了推動資本更加有效的分配所創(chuàng)造出的被蒂爾·古迪曼稱為“暴走的資本主義”，古迪曼是SunGard集團的全球副主席，同時也被稱為風(fēng)險價值之父。銀行在分析專業(yè)市場的風(fēng)險時，開始依賴定價模型，并且變得益發(fā)能繞過規(guī)則得利。結(jié)果就是，資本并不像人們所認為的那樣能夠有效的分配。
Big banks had also grown increasingly interdependent through the boom in derivatives, computer-driven equities trading and so on. Another bond was cross-ownership: at the start of the crisis, financial firms held big dollops of each other’s common and hybrid equity. Such tight coupling of components increases the danger of “non-linear” outcomes, where a small change has a big impact. “Financial markets are not only vulnerable to black swans but have become the perfect breeding ground for them,” says Mr Guldimann. In such a network a firm’s troubles can have an exaggerated effect on the perceived riskiness of its trading partners. When Lehman’s credit-default spreads rose to distressed levels, AIG’s jumped by twice what would have been expected on its own, according to the International Monetary Fund.
隨著金融衍生產(chǎn)品的盛行以及電腦股票交易的普及等等，銀行間的依賴性逐漸增強。有一種債券是跨所有制的：在金融危機的初期，很多金融公司相互持有大量同行的普通股全和混合股權(quán)。如此緊密的聯(lián)系使得“非線性”結(jié)果風(fēng)險大大增加，很小的一個變數(shù)就會產(chǎn)生很大的影響?！敖鹑谑袌霾粌H容易受到黑天鵝事件的影響，更成為了黑天鵝時間產(chǎn)生的溫床，”古迪曼說道。在這樣一個網(wǎng)絡(luò)中，某個公司的的問題可能會對其業(yè)務(wù)伙伴的可預(yù)料風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生倍數(shù)級的影響。國際貨幣基金稱，當(dāng)雷曼的信用違約息差上升到令人恐慌的高度時，美國國際集團的信用違約息差上升到其自身預(yù)計水平的兩倍。
Mr Haldane has suggested that these knife-edge dynamics were caused not only by complexity but also—paradoxically—by homogeneity. Banks, insurers, hedge funds and others bought smorgasbords of debt securities to try to reduce risk through diversification, but the ingredients were similar: leveraged loans, American mortgages and the like. From the individual firm’s perspective this looked sensible. But for the system as a whole it put everyone’s eggs in the same few baskets, as reflected in their returns (see chart 2).
霍爾丹認為這些刀口動態(tài)不僅僅是由于復(fù)雜性造成的，同時，還會因為同質(zhì)性。銀行，保險公司，對沖基金和其他的一些公司購買自助組合的債券，通過多樣化組合降低整體風(fēng)險，但是這些組合的成分是相同的：杠桿貸款，美國住房抵押貸款等等。從企業(yè)個體的角度來說，這種組合是明智的。但是從整個系統(tǒng)來看，每個人的雞蛋都放在了少數(shù)相同的籃子里，正如這些組合的回報所反映的那樣（見圖表2）。
Efforts are now under way to deal with these risks. The Financial Stability Board, an international group of regulators, is trying to co-ordinate global reforms in areas such as capital, liquidity and mechanisms for rescuing or dismantling troubled banks. Its biggest challenge will be to make the system more resilient to the failure of giants. There are deep divisions over how to set about this, with some favouring tougher capital requirements, others break-ups, still others—including America—a combination of remedies.
人們開始采取措施來應(yīng)對危機。國際監(jiān)管組織——金融穩(wěn)定委員會正力圖在資本，流動性和拯救陷入困境和破產(chǎn)邊緣的銀行方面來協(xié)調(diào)全球的改革。其中最大的挑戰(zhàn)是能夠讓系統(tǒng)在應(yīng)對銀行巨頭破產(chǎn)時能夠更有彈性。在這個問題上，組織內(nèi)存在嚴(yán)重分歧，一些人偏向于更加嚴(yán)格的資本要求，另一些人傾向于銀行解體，還有一些——包括美國——希望能有一個補救措施的組合。
In January President Barack Obama shocked big banks by proposing a tax on their liabilities and a plan to cap their size, ban “proprietary” trading and limit their involvement in hedge funds and private equity. The proposals still need congressional approval. They were seen as energising the debate about how to tackle dangerously large firms, though the reaction in Europe was mixed.
1月份，巴拉克·奧巴馬總統(tǒng)提出了一系列的議案，震驚了整個銀行界，包括對銀行負債征稅，限制銀行規(guī)模，禁止銀行進行“自營交易”，并且對銀行的對沖基金和私募股權(quán)業(yè)務(wù)加以限制。這些議案還需要提交國會批準(zhǔn)。奧巴馬的這些提議為如何處理處在困境之中的公司的辯論注入了新的活力，盡管這些提議在歐洲引發(fā)了不同的反應(yīng)。
Regulators are also inching towards a more “systemic” approach to risk. The old supervisory framework assumed that if the 100 largest banks were individually safe, then the system was too. But the crisis showed that even well-managed firms, acting prudently in a downturn, can undermine the strength of all.
監(jiān)管者們也正在向一個更加“系統(tǒng)化”處理危機的方向邁進。舊的監(jiān)管體系認為，如果100家最大的銀行各自是安全的，那么整個系統(tǒng)也就是安全的。但是這次的危機表明，盡管那些關(guān)系體系良好的公司，在經(jīng)濟低迷期能夠謹慎行事，同樣也會削弱整個系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定性。
The banks themselves will have to find a middle ground in risk management, somewhere between gut feeling and number fetishism. Much of the progress made in quantitative finance was real enough, but a firm that does not understand the flaws in its models is destined for trouble. This special report will argue that rules will have to be both tightened and better enforced to avoid future crises—but that all the reforms in the world will never guarantee total safety.
銀行自身也必須找到一個風(fēng)險管理的中間地帶，這個中間地帶介于直覺和盲目崇拜數(shù)字之間。很多數(shù)量金融方面的進展是確實有用的，但是如果一個公司不能了解它所用的模型的缺陷的話，陷入麻煩就在所難免。這篇特別報道表明，規(guī)則必須被加強和更好的執(zhí)行，以避免未來可能出現(xiàn)的危機——但是全球改革勢必不能保證完全的安全性。
