Family companies
家族企業(yè)
Relative success
建立在血緣上的成功
There are important lessons to be learnt from the surprising resilience of family firms
家族企業(yè)驚人的韌勁值得我們學(xué)習(xí)
Nov 1st 2014 | From the print edition of The Economist
譯者：nelsonxu511
TODAY real power is rarely inherited. Monarchs spend their lives cutting ribbons and attending funerals. Landed aristocrats have to climb the greasy pole if they want to wield serious influence. Even in the United States great dynasties such as the Clintons and Bushes have to go to the trouble ofgetting themselves elected. The one exception to this lies at the heart of the capitalist system: the family firm.
如今，真正的權(quán)力很少是由繼承所得。君王女皇們終日只是剪彩，出席葬禮。貴族地主們要想有正兒八經(jīng)的影響力就得吃苦奮斗。即使是在美國(guó)，克林頓和布什這樣的世家大族也得不辭辛苦，參加選舉。而在資產(chǎn)階級(jí)體系的核心卻存在著一個(gè)例外：家族企業(yè)。
Leading students of capitalism have been pronouncing the death rites of family companies for decades, arguing that family firms would be marginalised by the arrival of industrial capitalism. They also insisted that the Dallas-style downsides of family ownership would become more destructive: family quarrels would tear these companies apart and the law of regression to the mean would condemn them to lousy management. Most countries have a variation of the phrase “clogs to clogs in three generations”. For a long time, they appeared to be right: in both America and Europe, family firms were in retreat for much of the 20th century.
數(shù)十年來(lái)，資本主義的領(lǐng)軍學(xué)生們一直認(rèn)為，隨著資本主義工業(yè)化的到來(lái)，家族企業(yè)必將消亡。他們還堅(jiān)稱家族企業(yè)達(dá)拉斯式的的缺陷會(huì)變得更加嚴(yán)重：家族紛爭(zhēng)會(huì)讓這些企業(yè)陷入分裂狀態(tài)，盛極必衰的規(guī)律也會(huì)將企業(yè)置于混亂的管理之下。大多數(shù)國(guó)家都有“富不過(guò)三代”這個(gè)說(shuō)法。對(duì)于家族企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，這一說(shuō)法在很長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間內(nèi)都是正確的：無(wú)論在美國(guó)還是歐洲，家族企業(yè)在20世紀(jì)的大部分時(shí)間內(nèi)都處于衰退。
Yet that decline now seems to have been reversed. The proportion of Fortune 500 companies that can be described as family companies increased from 15% in 2005 to 19% today. That is largely because of the rise of emerging economies, in which family firms are more common. But even in the rich world family companies are these days holding their own. Of the American firms in the Fortune Global 500, 15% are family firms- only slightly less than a decade ago. In Europe, families control 40% of big listed companies.
然而，如今的家族企業(yè)似乎不衰反盛。世界500強(qiáng)中家族企業(yè)所占比率從2005年的15%增長(zhǎng)到了現(xiàn)在的19%。發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體的崛起很大程度上導(dǎo)致了這一現(xiàn)象。因?yàn)?，家族企業(yè)在發(fā)展中國(guó)家更常見。但就算在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家，現(xiàn)今的家族企業(yè)也是地位穩(wěn)固。在世界500強(qiáng)名單中，15%的美國(guó)公司都是家族企業(yè)。這一數(shù)據(jù)僅比十年前略低。在歐洲，四成的大型上市公司都為家族掌控。
You can happily go through a day consuming nothing but the products of family concerns: reading the New York Times (or the Daily Mail), driving a BMW (or a Ford or a Fiat), making calls on your Samsung Galaxy, munching on Mars Bars and watching Fox on your Comcast cable. And the growth is likely to continue. McKinsey predicts that in 2025, family companies from the emerging world will account for 37% of all companies with annual revenues of more than $1 billion, up from 16% in 2010.
讓你在一天之中只消費(fèi)家族企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品，你也能快活自在：讀紐約時(shí)報(bào)（或是每日郵報(bào)），開寶馬（或是福特或者菲亞特），用你的三星手機(jī)打電話，嚼火星棒巧克力，在康卡斯特有線電視上看福克斯頻道。并且，家族企業(yè)的繁榮可能會(huì)持續(xù)。麥肯錫公司預(yù)計(jì)，到2025年，發(fā)展中國(guó)家的家族企業(yè)能在所有年收益高于10億美元的公司中占到37%的比重。而在2010年，這一數(shù)據(jù)是16%。
Pass the silver spoon, Dad
把我的金勺遞過(guò)來(lái)，老爸
Why have family companies defied their obituarists? Many of them continue to suffer from serious problems: witness the recent debacle at Portugal’s Espírito Santo.But, particularly in the West, family firms have far fewer defects than in the past, largely because they have got better at addressing their obvious weaknesses.
家族企業(yè)曾被判下死刑，但如今卻勢(shì)頭正猛。這是為什么呢？盡管很多家族產(chǎn)業(yè)仍飽受嚴(yán)重問(wèn)題困擾（看看葡萄牙Espírito Santo家族的慘劇你就知道了），但是家族企業(yè)同過(guò)去相比少了很多缺陷。這點(diǎn)在西方尤其明顯，很大程度上是因?yàn)榧易鍖?duì)于其明顯不足之處，采取了更好的處理方法。
These days it is rare for a family boss to hand his job on to an obvious dud. Most family companies train future leaders by sending them to business schools and putting them through their paces in a succession of lower level jobs. A growing number (particularly in Germany) have become masters at moving family memberfrom executive jobs to supervisory roles in the boardroom. An entire consulting industry exists to help families deal with the peculiar dynamics of their companies, such as managing personal conflicts and sidelining thick relations without hurting their feelings.
在如今，家族企業(yè)的老大很少會(huì)讓位給“阿斗”。大多數(shù)繼任者會(huì)被送到商業(yè)學(xué)校，然后先從一系列低層工作做起。越來(lái)越多的家族企業(yè)（尤以德國(guó)家族企業(yè)為多）逐漸精于將家庭成員從行政崗位調(diào)至董事會(huì)中擔(dān)當(dāng)監(jiān)管職責(zé)。社會(huì)上出現(xiàn)了幫助企業(yè)家族處理企業(yè)獨(dú)特變故的一整套咨詢行業(yè)。這些公司替家族調(diào)解個(gè)人沖突，保證在削弱至親權(quán)力的同時(shí)不傷及親情。
Family firms’ strengths, meanwhile, are just as important today as they were in the early days of capitalism. They solve the “agency problem” that Adam Smith put his finger on in “The Wealth of Nations” when he argued that hired managers would never have the same “anxious vigilance” in running companies as the owners. Family managers are often parsimonious: companies such as Walmart, Koch Industries and Mars & Co are famous for running a tight ship with humble headquarters, lean management and an obsession with operational efficiency.They are good at thinking in terms of generations rather than quarterly results:Roche makes long-term bets on developing pharmaceuticals; the Murdochs and Newhouses have stuck with print media in difficult times.
如今，家族企業(yè)的實(shí)力一點(diǎn)不比資本主義早期遜色。它們解決了亞當(dāng)·斯密在《國(guó)富論》中指出的代理問(wèn)題。亞當(dāng)·斯密認(rèn)為雇來(lái)的經(jīng)理在對(duì)公司的管理上肯定不會(huì)像公司老板那樣警覺。家族企業(yè)中的老板通常極度節(jié)儉。在這一點(diǎn)上，諸如沃爾瑪、科氏工業(yè)和馬思咨詢這樣的公司是著名的例子。這些公司紀(jì)律嚴(yán)明，決策開明，管理簡(jiǎn)明，并且極其強(qiáng)調(diào)運(yùn)營(yíng)效率。這些公司都善于從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)計(jì)議，而不是只關(guān)注公司季度表現(xiàn)。譬如羅氏在研制藥物上就有長(zhǎng)期的打算，默多克家族和他的新聞集團(tuán)在困難時(shí)期仍舊堅(jiān)守紙媒。
But the emerging world is currently witnessing a battle for the soul of the family firm. Old-model family companies are sprawling conglomerates that rely on political connections to protect them from global competition and complex cross-ownership structures designed to give families maximum control for minimum cash.New-model family firms are professionally managed, transparent outfits whose owners maintain long-term vision and quality but eschew the sort of wheeling and dealing that made them rich in the first place.
但如今，一場(chǎng)關(guān)于家族企業(yè)的發(fā)展方向之爭(zhēng)正在發(fā)展中國(guó)家展開。老式做法中，龐大的家族企業(yè)依托政治關(guān)系在全球化帶來(lái)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中自我保護(hù)，并依靠復(fù)雜的交叉所有制結(jié)構(gòu)，用最少的花費(fèi)得到最大程度的控制權(quán)。新派的家族企業(yè)則是專業(yè)管理、透明運(yùn)營(yíng)的。企業(yè)家保有長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)視野，追求長(zhǎng)期質(zhì)量的同時(shí)，排斥當(dāng)初使得企業(yè)富強(qiáng)的手腕和伎倆。
The best way to ensure that the right side wins is to increase competition: India’s great liberalisation of the late 1990s persuaded Tata and Mahindra & Mahindra to transformthemselves. Emerging-world governments should also outlaw cross-ownership and strengthen the rights of non-family shareholders, as America did in the 1930s and other countries have done more recently.
確保家族企業(yè)往正道發(fā)展，最佳的做法是依靠激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。印度上世紀(jì)九十年代晚期的自由化經(jīng)濟(jì)改革使得Tata以及Mahindra & Mahindra 公司走上了正軌。發(fā)展中國(guó)家政府同時(shí)也應(yīng)該禁止交叉所有權(quán)，強(qiáng)化非親屬股東的權(quán)力。這一做法，美國(guó)于2003年采用，也有一些國(guó)家在近期使用。
The other great problem with family companies, which plagues the West as well as the emerging world, is that the weaker members of the breed have failed to learn from the stronger members. Too many fail to make even the most basic plans for the future: PricewaterhouseCoopers discovered that only 16% of the family firms it surveyed had put a formalsuccession plan in place.Too many lack the ambition to think that they can compete with the best in the world: convincedthat they are a bit of an anachronism they tend to keep themselves tothemselves. The remarkable record of the best family firms should remind millions ofbusiness owners that, in the corporate world at least, you do not have to surrender family control in order to prosper.
家族企業(yè)的另一個(gè)大問(wèn)題對(duì)西方和發(fā)展中國(guó)家均有荼毒，即血緣關(guān)系中，弱者并未學(xué)習(xí)到強(qiáng)者的能力。很多人連未來(lái)最基本的方案都定制不好。PricewaterhouseCoopers 公司發(fā)現(xiàn)只有16%的受調(diào)查家族企業(yè)有正式的接班方案。太多企業(yè)家缺乏野心，認(rèn)為他們不能無(wú)法同全球的頂尖公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。他們深信自己已為時(shí)代淘汰。然而，頂尖的家族企業(yè)應(yīng)該用它們輝煌的記錄提醒成千上萬(wàn)的企業(yè)家，至少在商業(yè)領(lǐng)域，要想公司欣欣向榮 ，不一定非要放棄家族對(duì)企業(yè)的控制權(quán)。
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