導(dǎo)讀：本周，塞浦路斯議會(huì)以36：0的投票結(jié)果否決了歐元區(qū)的救助，以抗議歐盟計(jì)劃對(duì)銀行存款實(shí)施大規(guī)模的征稅。
Charlemagne
查理曼
Small island, big finger
島國(guó)雖小，脾氣卻不小
Cyprus's rejection of a bail-out plan raises new doubts about the future of the euro
塞浦路斯否決救助計(jì)劃再次引發(fā)對(duì)歐元未來(lái)的擔(dān)憂
Mar 23rd 2013 |From the print edition
CALL it the cussedness of an island nation. Beneath the cheeriness of Aphrodite's sun-kissed island lies the intransigence of the Balkans and the Middle East. On the eve of its accession to the European Union in 2004, the Greek-Cypriot republic rejected a UN plan to reunite with the Turkish-Cypriot north, where the plan was supported.
你可以把它稱之為一個(gè)島國(guó)的倔強(qiáng)。這是一個(gè)沐浴在愛(ài)神陽(yáng)光之中的島國(guó)，在它那歡樂(lè)的表面之下是巴爾干和中東的不妥協(xié)與不讓步。在2004年加入歐盟的前夕，希臘族控制下的塞浦路斯否決了一項(xiàng)聯(lián)合國(guó)提出的計(jì)劃，拒絕同土耳其族控制下的北部實(shí)現(xiàn)重新統(tǒng)一。
Within the club the Greek-Cypriot government has used and abused EU institutions to wage its feud with Turkey and to lend support to Russia.
加入歐盟后，希臘族控制下的塞浦路斯政府又利用這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)對(duì)抗土耳其，并且還把歐盟提供給他們的援助出借給俄羅斯。
This week's 36-0 vote in the Cypriot parliament to reject a euro-zone bail-out, in protest at a large proposed tax on bank deposits, may be the most momentous act of bloody-mindedness yet, raising new questions about the stability, and even the survival, of the euro.
本周，塞浦路斯議會(huì)以36：0的投票結(jié)果否決了歐元區(qū)的救助，以抗議歐盟計(jì)劃對(duì)銀行存款實(shí)施大規(guī)模的征稅，這可能是迄今最為嚴(yán)重的一次蓄意犯上行為，它不僅重新引發(fā)了對(duì)穩(wěn)定的質(zhì)疑，而且還威脅到塞浦路斯以及歐元的生存。
Outside parliament, a demonstrator's poster summed up the mood: “Fuck Europe”. Such defiance from the island will be admired by some, yet it does not alter Cyprus's predicament. It is bust, and cannot afford to salvage its oversized and insolvent banks (see article).
在塞浦路斯議會(huì)外面，一位抗議者手中的標(biāo)語(yǔ)概括地道出了這個(gè)島國(guó)的反抗情緒。標(biāo)語(yǔ)是這樣寫(xiě)的：“XXX，歐洲”。雖然有人會(huì)對(duì)這種不屈大加贊賞，但是這改變不了塞浦路斯的困境。這個(gè)國(guó)家已經(jīng)破產(chǎn)，而且無(wú)力拯救那些規(guī)模過(guò)于龐大而且資不抵債的銀行。
Cyprus is also trying to play the euro zone against Russia, amid rumours that it might be prepared to offer Russia concessions in offshore gasfields or a naval base.
塞浦路斯正在試圖依靠俄羅斯來(lái)對(duì)抗歐元區(qū)。有傳言說(shuō)，該國(guó)準(zhǔn)備以近海天燃?xì)鈿馓锘蛘吆＼娀貋?lái)?yè)Q取俄羅斯的讓步。
But who really holds the gun—the firing squad, or the prisoner? The question was raised in Greece last year, and leaders decided to keep it in the euro, even at the cost of overt and covert debt-forgiveness.
但是，誰(shuí)才是真正拿槍的那個(gè)人呢？——是劊子手，還是囚徒 ？這個(gè)問(wèn)題早在去年就曾在希臘出現(xiàn)過(guò)。當(dāng)時(shí)，歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人們決定，即使付出部分或全部減免債務(wù)的代價(jià)，也要讓希臘留在歐元區(qū)內(nèi)。
Cyprus is even smaller, accounting for just 0.2% of euro-zone GDP. Yet Eurocrats insist it too is of “systemic” importance. A bank run in Cyprus could start one in other countries with dodgy banks. And the prospect of Cyprus's exit from the euro would raise doubts about the future of other weak members of the currency.
相比之下，塞浦路斯是一個(gè)更小的國(guó)家，其國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值僅為歐元區(qū)GDP的0.2%。不過(guò)，歐盟官員堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，塞浦路斯也具有“系統(tǒng)性”的重要性。塞浦路斯銀行的擠兌有可能引起其他國(guó)家的問(wèn)題銀行也出現(xiàn)擠兌，同時(shí)，塞國(guó)退出歐元區(qū)的預(yù)期也會(huì)引發(fā)了人們對(duì)該貨幣體系中其他弱勢(shì)國(guó)家的未來(lái)的擔(dān)憂。
For now, the Eurocrats say it is up to Cyprus to come up with an alternative plan. Perhaps they think Cyprus will have to come to its senses if it is ever to reopen its banks. And if it remains obstinate, some would see advantage in making an example of the Cypriots. To euro-zone hawks, the spread of moral hazard is the most dangerous form of contagion.
目前來(lái)看，歐盟官員認(rèn)為，現(xiàn)在該是塞浦路斯提出替代性的方案的時(shí)候了。他們之所以這樣想，或許是因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)識(shí)到，如果塞國(guó)想讓銀行重新開(kāi)門(mén)營(yíng)業(yè)，該國(guó)將不得不做出讓步；如果塞國(guó)繼續(xù)頑抗下去，有人就會(huì)利用他們的例子大做文章。對(duì)于歐元區(qū)的鷹派來(lái)說(shuō)，道德淪喪的擴(kuò)散是最危險(xiǎn)的傳染方式。
In many ways, the mess in Cyprus comes down to the political symbolism of round numbers. Germany said the euro zone would lend no more than €10 billion ($13 billion) to recapitalise Cyprus's banks and refinance its debt. The IMF insisted the island's debt should be kept below 100% of GDP by 2020.
塞國(guó)的混亂從多個(gè)方面體現(xiàn)出了周邊國(guó)家的政治。德國(guó)認(rèn)為，歐元區(qū)借給塞浦路斯為銀行注資和為債務(wù)再融資的資金不能超過(guò)100億歐元（合130億美元）；國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）則堅(jiān)持說(shuō)，這個(gè)島國(guó)的債務(wù)到2020年時(shí)應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)陀谄銰DP的總額；
And Nicos Anastasiades, the new president of Cyprus, was adamant that any tax levied on big depositors should be kept below 10%. Put crudely, the euro zone and the IMF ensured the bail-out should be accompanied by a bail-in of depositors; but Cyprus chose to inflict much of the pain on grandmothers' savings so as to limit the losses of Russian oligarchs.
而塞浦路斯新總統(tǒng)尼克斯·阿納斯塔夏季斯也不肯讓步，堅(jiān)持對(duì)大儲(chǔ)戶的征稅稅率應(yīng)當(dāng)保持在10%以下?；\統(tǒng)地講，歐元區(qū)和IMF要確保救助與自救同步進(jìn)行；而塞浦路斯則選擇將大部分痛苦轉(zhuǎn)嫁給祖父輩的存款，為的是以此減少俄羅斯寡頭們的損失。
As so often, short-term politics has trumped rational crisis-management. The deal in Cyprus should have been a dry run for the banking union that the euro zone seeks to create. Instead it has raised questions about whether Europeans genuinely intend to break the link between weak banks and weak sovereigns.
如同以前經(jīng)常發(fā)生的那樣，短期的政治行為總是能壓倒理性的危機(jī)管理。塞浦路斯協(xié)議本應(yīng)是歐盟想要建立的那種銀行聯(lián)盟的一次預(yù)演。誰(shuí)承想，該協(xié)議卻對(duì)歐盟是否真心想要打破弱勢(shì)銀行與弱勢(shì)主權(quán)國(guó)家之間的聯(lián)系提出了質(zhì)疑。
Take deposit guarantees. In the early days of the financial crisis the EU raised deposit insurance to €100,000 to prevent bank runs. Now it risks provoking them by seeming to breach that guarantee. National deposit insurance is plainly limited by the solvency of the state. A common deposit-guarantee system in the euro zone makes sense, however much the Germans and Eurocrats may claim it is irrelevant.
讓我們以存款擔(dān)保為例來(lái)說(shuō)明一下這個(gè)問(wèn)題。在金融危機(jī)初期，為了防止銀行發(fā)生擠兌，歐盟將受保護(hù)的存款上限提高到100000歐元。如今，歐盟似乎正在以違背擔(dān)保的方式來(lái)冒險(xiǎn)激怒儲(chǔ)戶。國(guó)家對(duì)存款的保護(hù)完全是由國(guó)家的主權(quán)來(lái)界定的。雖說(shuō)在歐元區(qū)內(nèi)建立一個(gè)普通的存款保證制度屬于情理之中的事，但大多數(shù)德國(guó)人與歐盟官員卻宣稱這與他們毫不相關(guān)。
Then look at the promise of a common means of winding down troubled banks. Uniform bank-resolution rules were supposed to be adopted in each EU country, and later on a unified system was due to be created for the euro zone. The Cyprus deal makes a mockery of the proposed hierarchy of creditors to absorb bank losses: senior bondholders (few in the case of Cyprus) have been spared but small depositors penalised.
其次，我們?cè)賮?lái)看看那些采取普通方式對(duì)問(wèn)題銀行進(jìn)行瘦身的承諾。根據(jù)歐盟的設(shè)想，每一個(gè)成員國(guó)都應(yīng)當(dāng)采納統(tǒng)一的銀行決議規(guī)則，隨后，歐元區(qū)還將為此而創(chuàng)建一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的體系。塞浦路斯協(xié)議是對(duì)由債權(quán)人按照等級(jí)來(lái)承擔(dān)銀行損失這一提議的嘲諷。因?yàn)閮?yōu)先債券持有人的利益（在塞浦路斯的案例中幾乎沒(méi)有）并受到損害，最后買(mǎi)單的都是小儲(chǔ)戶。
With a proper banking union, other options become possible. One is the orderly wind-down of Cyprus's two big crippled banks. This would impose heavier losses on large deposits (up to 50%), but protect small savers and shrink the banking sector. Another option would be the direct recapitalisation of banks by the euro zone. And with a less rickety banking system, it would be easier to get tough with rule breakers.
在建立了合適的銀行聯(lián)盟后，歐盟的選項(xiàng)可能會(huì)隨之而增多。其中之一就是允許塞浦路斯國(guó)內(nèi)已經(jīng)癱瘓的兩家大銀行有序地破產(chǎn)，這雖然有可能給大儲(chǔ)戶（約總儲(chǔ)戶總數(shù)的50%）帶來(lái)較為沉重的損失，卻能讓小儲(chǔ)戶免受其害，并且還可縮小該國(guó)的銀行業(yè)。另一個(gè)選項(xiàng)是由歐元區(qū)對(duì)銀行進(jìn)行直接注資。隨著銀行系統(tǒng)變得不再那么不堪一擊，歐盟就可以更容易地懲處違規(guī)者。
Draghi's dilemmas
德拉吉的兩難困境
Amid the muddling of European leaders, Mario Draghi, boss of the ECB, has stood out as the prime guarantor of the euro. His conditional promise to buy the bonds of vulnerable sovereigns did much to restore calm last year, though it has never been tested.
雖然歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人表現(xiàn)的昏聵無(wú)能，但作為歐元主要擔(dān)保人的歐洲央行行長(zhǎng)馬里奧·德拉吉卻一直表現(xiàn)出色。他曾在去年做出購(gòu)買(mǎi)脆弱主權(quán)國(guó)家債券的有條件承諾，該承諾雖然為恢復(fù)局勢(shì)做出了巨大的貢獻(xiàn)，但一直沒(méi)有接受檢驗(yàn)。
The ECB, moreover, is being charged with overseeing a new single euro-zone bank supervisor. Its jealously guarded independence is supposed to lend credibility to the system. Yet the more the ECB involves itself in managing the crisis, the more it sullies itself with politics.
除此之外，歐洲央行還承擔(dān)著歐元區(qū)新型單一貨幣銀行監(jiān)督者的責(zé)任，它小心翼翼地維護(hù)著自己獨(dú)立性，而這種獨(dú)立性被認(rèn)為是給整個(gè)貨幣體系提供了信用。然而，只要?dú)W洲央行更多地介入危機(jī)應(yīng)對(duì)，它同政治的瓜葛就會(huì)越發(fā)糾纏不清。
And having been intimately involved in the botched plan for Cyprus's banks, and insisted on the protection of senior bondholders, it is reasonable to question whether the ECB is up to the task of bank supervision.
由于它深深地卷入了拯救塞浦路斯銀行的蹩腳計(jì)劃，并且還在保護(hù)高級(jí)債券持有人問(wèn)題上固執(zhí)已見(jiàn)，因此完全有理由對(duì)歐洲央行是否履行了監(jiān)管責(zé)任提出質(zhì)疑。
There is another question: now that voters in Italy and MPs in Cyprus have openly rejected the strictures of the euro zone, might the ECB's magic spell be broken? After all, its bond-buying policy depends crucially on troubled countries submitting to a euro-zone reform programme. The ECB may reach a decisive moment sooner.
另一個(gè)問(wèn)題是：既然意大利選民和塞浦路斯議員都已經(jīng)公開(kāi)反對(duì)歐元區(qū)的刁難，那么歐洲央行的魔咒有可能被打破嗎？說(shuō)到底，歐洲央行的債券購(gòu)買(mǎi)政策關(guān)鍵在于問(wèn)題國(guó)家是否會(huì)屈服于對(duì)歐元區(qū)的改革計(jì)劃。歐洲央行很快就會(huì)迎來(lái)一個(gè)決定性的時(shí)刻。
Cyprus' banks survive only on the ECB's emergency liquidity. If there is no deal in Cyprus, the ECB will have to decide whether to follow through on its ultimatum to cut off the money within days.
塞浦路斯的銀行只有依靠歐洲央行提供的緊急流動(dòng)性才能生存下去。如果塞浦路斯拿不出協(xié)議，歐洲央行將被迫決定，是否按照其最后通牒的要求在數(shù)天之內(nèi)切斷資金供應(yīng)。
This would cause a messy collapse and almost certainly push Cyprus out of the euro. Mr Draghi has bravely stepped in to defend the weakest members of the euro zone. But would he dare to shoot one of his own?
這可能會(huì)引發(fā)一場(chǎng)無(wú)序的崩潰，而且?guī)缀蹩隙〞?huì)逼迫塞浦路斯退出歐元區(qū)。德拉吉曾經(jīng)勇敢地站出來(lái)保護(hù)歐元區(qū)內(nèi)最弱勢(shì)的成員國(guó)。但現(xiàn)在的問(wèn)題在于，他敢向自己人開(kāi)槍嗎？
【日積月累】
intransigence n.不妥協(xié)
feud n.不和
contagion n.蔓延
oligarch n.寡頭統(tǒng)治集團(tuán)成員
stricture n.狹窄
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